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The Theaetetus is the first sustained philosophical inquiry into 
knowledge. The dialogue is presented through the conversations 
of five characters—Euclides, Terpsion, Socrates, Theodorus, and 
Theaetetus—the last three of which carry the burden of the dia-
logue. Early in the dialogue, Socrates, Theodorus, and Theaetetus 
consider the question "What is knowledge?" and spend the rest of 
the dialogue entertaining three theories of knowledge. The first 
theory is that knowledge is perception, the second that knowledge 
is true judgment, and the third that knowledge is true judgment with 
an account. Through the method of question and answer, Socrates 
shows that each account fails to properly capture what knowledge 
is in some way or another. The dialogue concludes without a posi-
tive answer to the question, though the three main interlocutors 
agree to meet the following day to continue their conversation. 
This paper will investigate the first of the three theories of 
knowledge offered by Theaetetus, namely, that knowledge is per-
ception. In particular, this paper will address the claim that the 
Protagorean relativism employed as a defense of the first theory is 
self-refuting. Many fine Plato scholars and other philosophers ar-
gue that Protagorean relativism is self-refuting, among them Myles 
Burnyeat,1 Ronald M. Polansky,2 and John Passmore.3 However, 
in her article "Protagoras and Inconsistency," Sarah Waterlow of-
fers a rival interpretation of Protagoras' relativism under which 
relativism doesn't so much refute itself as show itself to be, in her 
words, a "dialectical nothing."41 aim to make clear in this paper 
Waterlow's interpretation of Protagoras' relativism and her criti-
cism of the Burnyeat/Polansky/Passmore position [hereafter BPP]. 
I will also defend Waterlow's interpretion against the BPP posi-
tion. First, though, a significant amount of background on the dia-
logue is required. 
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I 
The substantive dialogue begins when Socrates runs into 
Theodorus, an old man and respected mathematician from Cyrene. 
Theodorus tells Socrates about Theaetetus, the old mathematician's 
brightest and most "amazingly gifted"student (144a). Socrates de-
cides to stay and "examine" the young Theaetetus (145b). 
Theaetetus reports to Socrates that he is learning geometry, as-
tronomy, music, and arithmetic from Theodorus. In response, 
Socrates states that such learning should make him become wise— 
that is, an expert—about that which he studies.5 Socrates then 
makes known a worry that he thinks Theaetetus and Theodorus 
can help him investigate. The worry is an epistemic one: Socrates 
says that he "can't get a proper grasp of what on earth knowledge 
really is" (146a). Theaetetus' brief description of his own course 
of study and Socrates' mention of the expertise it is thought that 
Theaetetus should acquire as his learning progresses frames the 
context for Socrates' worry. Burnyeat identifies the bearing the 
worry has on the very idea of expertise explaining that "[e]xpertise 
is specialized knowledge (knowledge which most people do not 
have), hence it is problematic if knowledge itself is problematic."6 
So, the worry is not 'merely academic' At stake in the answer to 
the question is the justification for our belief in expertise and the 
order of the social world it makes possible in the form of the teacher-
student relationship, the master-apprentice association, etc. 
Theaetetus' first answer was simply a list of some of the 
branches of theoretical and practical knowledge (146d). In response, 
Socrates reminds Theaetetus that he was "not asked to say what 
one may have knowledge of, or how many branches of knowledge 
there are... [but rather] what knowledge itself is" (146e). After this 
clarification is offered and after Socrates explains to Theaetetus 
that his (Socrates') role as interlocutor is likened to that of a mid-
wife, helping the youth give birth to ideas as women give birth to 
newborns, Theaetetus produces his second answer, that "knowl-
edge is simply perception" (15 le). Given that the justification of 
expertise is riding on the answer to the question, it may be surprising 
that Theaetetus throws down such an unamenable answer. In fact, 
Burnyeat somewhat rhetorically asks, "should we . . . take . . . 
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expertise as something which an adequate account of knowledge 
should cater for? That, however, might lead us to think that 
Theaetetus' first properly formulated definition, 'Knowledge is per-
ception', is mistaken from the start."7 Burnyeat is, I think, correct in 
this assessment.8 
As the conversation between Theaetetus and Socrates 
progresses, two other theses are added to the claim that 'knowl-
edge is perception' to support it, namely, Protagoras' doctrine that 
man is the measure of all things and Heraclitus' extreme flux theory. 
Protagoras' doctrine, as Socrates understands it, is that "as each 
thing appears to me, so it is for me, and as it appears to you, so it is 
for you" (152a). In fact, perception "is always of what is, and 
unerring—as befits knowledge" (152c). Burnyeat interprets this to 
mean that "however things appear to someone, things are for this 
person just the way they appear, and if they appear different to 
someone else, then for that person they really and truly are dif-
ferent."9 The extreme flux theory of Heraclitus is that everything 
is constantly changing, paradoxically summed up in the dictum that 
'you cannot step into the same river twice.' The relationship be-
tween these three theses and Plato's posture toward them merit 
attention. 
As midwife, Socrates urges Theaetetus to give birth to his idea 
by thinking about what must be the case if it is a true account: if 
perception is knowledge and if we perceive whatever appears to 
us through our senses, then it must be the case that each individual 
"man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they 
are, and of the things which are not, that they are not" (152a). Call 
this the Measure Doctrine. According to Theaetetus, perception 
alone "provides knowledge and certainty, and from Protagoras' 
Measure Doctrine we have a guarantee that every perceptual ap-
pearance will be the unerring apprehension of how things are for 
the perceiver."10 Consider the case of two perceivers out and about 
on a windy day. To one of them, the wind appears cold; to the 
other, the wind appears warm. According to Protagoras, if the wind 
is cold for one perceiver and not for another, then it cannot be the 
case that one perceiver is right and the other wrong. It cannot 
even be said that both are wrong. There simply "is no such thing as 
the temperature of the wind by which to correct, or confirm, some-
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one"1 1 who says anything about the temperature of the wind. No 
independent fact about the temperature of the wind exists about 
which anyone could be mistaken. Each perceiver, then, is neces-
sarily and unmistakably correct about how things perceived are for 
him. 
The best metaphysical support for the epistemological queer-
ness of the Measure Doctrine is that what is perceived is con-
stantly changing. There is no such thing as the temperature of 
wind as such because there are no objects or properties of objects 
that endure through time. This is Heraclitus' Extreme Flux ac-
count. According to this account, "there is nothing but motion" 
(156a), where the specific sense-experiences of an agent are "con-
stituted in and by the interplay of various motions including those 
which are his sense-organs."12 Burnyeat claims that the Heraclitean 
story "teaches us that there are no things, only processes—the 
world is a vast array of motions."13 So, knowledge is perception 
because each man is his own measure of the world, where the 
world is itself nothing but a complex of patterns of motion. Ironi-
cally, it is Socrates' expertise in conducting the method of question 
and answer that exhibits the many flaws in Theaetetus' first ac-
count of knowledge.14 
Consider, for a moment, the relativism of the Measure Doc-
trine. In showing the link between the Measure Doctrine and the 
Extreme Flux account, Burnyeat helps to bring to light the relativ-
ism required by the 'knowledge is perception' story. Burnyeat ex-
plains that "[o]bjects cannot have a continuing identity through time 
if every feature they manifest is relativized to a single perceiver 
and to the time of their perception, and every feature must be so 
relativized if perceptual awareness is incorrigible: stability through 
time, no less than objectivity between different observers, would 
constitute an independent fact of the matter by reference to which 
one perception could be counted right, another wrong."15 Socrates 
characterizes this relativism in representing the Protagorean posi-
tion when he says that "my perception is true for me—because it 
is always a perception of that being which is peculiarly mine" 
(160c). After laying out the nuances of the "knowledge is percep-
tion" theory, Socrates tries his hand at criticizing it, suggesting that 
such a relativistic theory makes unintelligible the very idea of ex-
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pertise that a good theory of knowledge, it seems, should defend. 
In fact, the expertise of Protagoras himself, the author of the Mea-
sure Doctrine, is thrown into question. Socrates asks Theodorus 
why anyone should pay the supposedly wise Protagoras any sum 
of money to listen to his purported wisdom when we "are our-
selves each the measure of his own wisdom?" (161c). 
The answer to this question—and Socrates' own generous de-
fense of Protagoras at 165e-168c—need not concern us here. In-
stead, notice the way that Plato expands the scope of the level of 
reflection on the status of things relativized. Up to this point in the 
dialogue, "the strategy of relativization has been applied only to the 
sensory predicates involved in perception (152c), although 'good' 
and 'bad' were slipped in at 157d." 1 6 However, beginning at 161d, 
Plato takes the Measure Doctrine to apply not only to all percep-
tions, but to all judgments as well. 1 7 Take the Protagorean formula 
'x appears F to Ö , ' which, in our earlier example, became 'the wind 
appears cold to me.' Beginning at 161 d in the dialogue, instead of a 
"sensible object appearing to a perceiver, . . . x may be, for ex-
ample, a law or practice (167c) or someone's opinion (171a), a 
may be a whole city as well as any individual (167c, 172a), and the 
predicate term F may be 'just' (167c, 172a), 'false' (170d, 171a), 
'persuasive' (178c)." 1 8 Between 169d-171d, Protagoras' Measure 
Doctrine stands in the place of*. With this move, Plato sets Socrates 
up to consider the status of the Measure Doctrine within the 
epistemic parameters of what the Doctrine itself permits. 
II 
This brings me to the particular concern that I now want to 
consider: the flaw that Burnyeat, Polansky, and Passmore suppose 
Plato to have discovered, exploited, and criticized. The flaw is that of 
the alleged self-refuting character of the relativism of the 
Protagorean account, when the account is treated within the 
epistemic parameters just mentioned. At 171a, Socrates notes that 
the Measure Doctrine "has this most exquisite feature: Protagoras 
admits... that the contrary opinion about his own opinion (namely, 
that it is false) must be true, seeing he agrees that all men judge what 
is." Yet, if this is the case, Socrates shrewdly demonstrates, then "in 
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conceding the truth of the opinion of those who think him wrong, he 
[Protagoras] is really admitting the falsity of his own opinion" (171b). 
Hence, it appears that Socrates has shown Protagoreanism to be 
self-refuting. Socrates' last challenging question at 171c, left unan-
swered by the weary, befuddled Theodorus, should, it seems, have 
driven the final nail into Protagoras' coffin: "since it is disputed by 
everyone, the Truth of Protagoras is not true for anyone at all, not 
even for himself?" The obvious answer is a resounding "y e s -" All 
this seems to indisputably support the BPP position. 
Burnyeat is convinced that it does. The following is his recon-
struction of the argument: 
[L]et us consider... the widespread belief that people are some-
times ignorant and wrong, that false judgment does occur. If 
people are right to think that there is false judgment, there is. But 
equally, if they are wrong in this belief, there is false judgment 
(for here is an instance of it). But Protagoras must say—must he 
not?—either that they are right or that they are wrong: unless he 
is willing to go so far as to deny that people do hold this view 
about each other's ignorance and expertise. To deny that, 
Theodorus agrees, would be quite implausible (170c). So 
Protagoras is caught in a dilemma. Whichever answer he gives 
has the consequence that false judgment occurs, which the 
Measure Doctrine must deny.19 
Essentially, Burnyeat claims that Protagorean "relativism is self-
refuting, and for reasons that go deep into the nature of assertion 
and belief."20 
A somewhat similar assessment is offered by Passmore.21 
Passmore's reconstruction of Plato's argument at 171a-171d is as 
follows: 
[I]f Protagoras is right in thinking that what anyone takes to be 
true is true, it will follow that his opponents are right in denying 
that that which anyone takes to be true is true, since this is how 
matters appear to them. So if Protagoras is correct, it will follow 
both that man is the measure of all things (since this is how it 
appears to Protagoras) and that man is not the measure of all 
things (since this is how it appears to his opponents). Hence his 
theory is in a precise sense self-contradictory.22 
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Finally, Polansky succinctly sums up the difficulty with 
Protagoras in just two sentences: 
For the person denying that he is the measure, it is true to that 
person that he is no measure. While in a sense this accords with 
the doctrine, because it makes truth relative, it also subverts the 
doctrine, for inasmuch as it is true to that person that he is not a 
measure, the supposition that every person is a measure be-
comes false.23 
The interpretations of Burnyeat, Passmore, and Polansky clearly 
constitute a unified position on the question of the self-refuting24 
character of Protagoreanism. 
Ill 
Enter Sarah Waterlow, the voice of dissent. Waterlow ac-
knowledges that were he "[jjudged by standard logical principles, 
Protagoras would certainly appear to be contradicting himself by 
. . . agreeing to his opponents' assertion that the doctrine is false 
and that not every sentient being 'is a measure.'"25 As we will 
see, however, Protagoras cannot be held to or judged by stan-
dard logical principles, such as the law of non-contradiction. On 
account of this, Waterlow is critical of the reading of the relativ-
ism of the Theaetetus supported by the BPP position. 
Assume for the moment that Plato really is trying to show 
Protagorean relativism to be self-refuting on the grounds that it is 
inconsistent. Plato, then, according to Waterlow, will prove the po-
sition untenable because an inconsistent position is 
necessarily false . . . [However,] if he aims to show that it is 
necessarily false, he flagrantly begs the question against 
Protagoras. For the issue is, precisely, whether opinions can be 
false. To argue on the assumption that a position of a certain 
nature (viz. an inconsistent position) is necessarily false, is al-
ready to have assumed that such a position can be false, which is 
exactly what Protagoras denies concerning all positions that are 
actually held as opinions . . . It would be useless, then to show 
that Protagoras holds an inconsistent set of beliefs. By his lights, 
whatever is believed is true. It follows that even what is inconsis-
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tently believed is true, even when the inconsistency occurs in 
beliefs held by the same subject, e.g. Protagoras himself.26 
The charge of self-refutation, then, is no reason to reject as false a 
theory that is committed to its own negation. So, if Plato's argu-
ment were that the Protagorean position is false on the grounds 
that it is inconsistent, the argument would be fallacious because it 
assumes the very thing it attempts to prove. The principle of char-
ity suggests that Plato doesn't really endorse a fallacious argu-
ment, so we should consider Waterlow's alternative reading. And 
since the BPP position is that Plato argued that Protagorean rela-
tivism is self-refuting, the BPP position is inadequate. 
A second argument against the BPP position concerns the im-
possibility of the application of the law of non-contradiction to 
Protagoras' relativism. According to a Waterlowvian analysis of 
Protagorean relativism, what is inconsistently believed is true, even 
when the inconsistency occurs in beliefs held by (what ostensibly 
looks like) the same subject. Yet, surely, if there were ever an 
example where an inconsistency led to a falsity, this would appear 
to be it. However, Waterlow states that 
a contradiction can only occur when it is the same subject that 
holds both contradictory beliefs. But the Theaetetan Protagoras 
is a Heraclitean. He professes to hold that a subject is never the 
same from one instant to another. He can argue, therefore, that 
even if it seems that he, Protagoras, is guilty of inconsistency, 
the expression 'he, Protagoras' denotes a fiction We ought 
to regard each of what appears to be a contradiction as a sepa-
rate belief belonging to a different subject. Before one has fin-
ished thinking 'p and q' (where 'q' entails 'not-p'), the 'one' has 
been replaced.27 
So, the charge of inconsistency is never a threat to Protagorean 
relativism, because inconsistency never occurs. 
IILA 
Let us now consider the Waterlowvian interpretation of 
Protagorean relativism. Waterlow makes what she takes to be a 
crucial distinction between agreeing with an interlocutor and shar-
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ing with them their opinion, a distinction the recognition of which, 
she claims, should change how we read the relativism of the 
Theaetetus. In explaining her reading of the agreeing/sharing dis-
tinction and its significance in reconsidering the BPP position on 
Protagorean relativism, Waterlow states that it should "be noted 
that Plato does not show Protagoras actually asserting that his 
doctrine is false, or as asserting its contradictory. He presents him 
as simply agreeing to the opponents' assertions."28 Waterlow sug-
gests that we should not assume that agreeing with an opinion 
entails that one likewise holds the opinion in question. If we do 
assume that agreeing entails sharing, and the opinion so agreed 
upon is inconsistent with another opinion already held, then the 
individual that agrees has contradicted herself. But this, Waterlow 
argues, couldn't possibly represent what's going on with Protagoras, 
for being convicted of an inconsistency would be of no conse-
quence for Protagoras, as being so convicted is not a prima facie 
indication of falsity. Protagoras, then, does not make the agreeing/ 
sharing distinction so as to avoid contradiction. Nonetheless, 
Waterlow claims that Protagorean relativism trades on a distinc-
tion between agreeing and sharing in the Theaetetus. 
Consider the following conditional: only if A's agreement with 
B's assertion necessarily entails that A also asserts what B holds 
would it then "follow from Protagoras' agreement with his oppo-
nents that he too shares their view and so contradicts his own 
thesis."29 However, by linking the Measure Doctrine to the Ex-
treme Flux account, and granting the existence of at least two 
different observers in a world of extreme flux to whom the Mea-
sure Doctrine applies, Protagoras' relativism nullifies any such nec-
essary entailment. Although he says that all beliefs are true, 
Protagoras "does not himself subscribe to all beliefs. His admis-
sion that another's belief is true is the admission that there is, rela-
tively to that other, a reality that makes the latter's belief a true 
one."3 0 This admission clearly follows from the Measure Doctrine, 
according to which "each subject has his own set of appearances 
and objects making them true."31 
The existence of my relative reality, then, does not entail the 
existence of a qualitatively identical relative reality for you. Al-
though Protagoras must agree with his opponent's opposing view 
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by holding it to be true, "it does not follow that he shares in that 
view. But unless he shares in it, he does not contradict himself, for 
he does not hold any view that conflicts with his doctrine."32 And 
yet, even if Protagoras were to contradict himself, such a contra-
diction would not be an indication of the falsity of opinion so ex-
pressed. The agreeing/sharing distinction simply follows as a nec-
essary consequence of the Measure Doctrine and the Extreme 
Flux account, and thus is not introduced as a stopgap measure to 
avoid the "threat" of self-contradiction, which could never defeat 
Protagorean relativism in the first place. 
III.B 
The specific character of Waterlow's interpretation of 
Protagoras' relativism deserves an explanation. Waterlow warns 
that the kind of relativism in question cannot be a relativism of 
truth, as the 
question of truth can only arise once a conceptual distinction is 
made (not that Protagoras considers how, if his theory is true, 
we could ever have come to make it) between what are really 
only aspects of the same thing, the appearance and its object. 
All appearances are true precisely because the object cannot 
fail to exist when the appearance exists.33 
According to Waterlow, Protagorean relativism is a relativism of 
fact, for "[wjhat is relative to the believer is the reality that makes 
the belief true. It is what is measured that exists only for, or rela-
tively to, the man that is its measure."34 Consider again the ex-
ample of two individuals perceiving the temperature of the wind. 
One of the perceivers holds the view that the wind is hot; the other 
perceiver holds the view that the wind is cold. According to the 
Waterlowvian analysis, they each hold the views that they do be-
cause they each experience a different reality. This interpretation 
of the character of Protagoras' relativism is based on the theory of 
perception "according to which there is no ontological distinction 
between an appearance and the quality of which it is an appear-
ance."35 In other words, in Protagoras' theory of perception, there 
is no objective reality behind the appearances against which differ-
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ent observers could intersubjectively check their observations. Pre-
cisely because there is no objective reality behind the appearances, 
to hold a view is to have a reality. Yet when the agent who per-
ceives the cold wind agrees with the agent who perceives the hot 
wind that the wind is hot, she is not sharing with that agent the 
same experience of the same reality—is not, that is, sharing with 
the other perceiver an inner belief-state of qualitatively identical 
content. Rather, possessed of intellectual virtue, the agent who 
agrees (though does not necessarily share) is doing what is re-
quired by the Measure Doctrine. 
Waterlow continues to argue that 
while both appearance and object depend for their existence on 
the subject, it is not the case that the relation "between" them 
(namely, their ultimate identity, which ensures that the appear-
ance can never not be of an object) is itself something further 
that also depends for its existence on the subject. The being 
true of the appearance simply follows from the appearance's 
existing at all. Thus Protagoras can, and does, say that a belief is 
true (simpliciter), not true-for-a-subject.36 
This, however, changes how we think of the scope of Protagoras' 
Measure Doctrine. Waterlow argues that Protagoras must ulti-
mately admit that "this doctrine of his concerning appearances and 
truth is itself only an appearance to him, Protagoras, and hence is 
made true by a fact that exists relatively to himself."37 The 
truthmaker (viz. reality) that makes his own theory true exists only 
relatively to Protagoras himself. Still, in terms consistent with his 
theory, Protagoras can "maintain that since relative reality exists 
(so that his appearance has an object), the . . . [theory-as-appear-
ing-to-him] is true (simpliciter)."38 
Conclusion 
If Waterlow's interpretation is correct, where does it leave us? 
According to the BPP position, Protagorean relativism is a self-
refuting position that for reasons of logic must be rejected. But, as 
we saw, the interpretation on which the BPP position rests is inad-
equate. What is Plato's position on Protagorean relativism, if, in-
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deed, it isn't self-refuting? Waterlow claims that Plato really sees 
the Protagorean position as a "dialectical nothing."39The interlocu-
tor cannot get any purchase on Protagoras in an argument, given 
that there is no way to ever negotiate with him. Protagoras offers 
no resistance to an interlocutor in a philosophical conversation; in 
fact, Protagoras never rejects any proposition that any opponent 
ever floats by him. Protagoras cannot even inject any doubt in his 
own opinions, as the very possibility of doubt would imply that an 
appearance might be false. Protagorean relativism, then, is a con-
versational non-starter. Nothing any interlocutor can say can logi-
cally compel Protagoras to change, protect, rethink or even reaf-
firm his own opinions. The act of elenchus with Protagoras is sim-
ply impossible; one never "gets anywhere" in the conversation. 
There simply is no offspring for Socrates as midwife to deliver, not 
even a wind egg. 
Waterlow's interpretation is internally coherent and textually 
sensitive. What is most surprising about the BPP position is that 
two of the three contributors to the position wrote their commen-
taries on the Theaetetus well after the publication, in 1977, of 
Waterlow's article. Neither Burnyeat's commentary, published in 
1990, nor Polansky's commentary, published in 1992, deal with the 
complexities raised by Waterlow's article. Burnyeat's article cites 
Waterlow's article only once in a footnote, urging the reader to 
compare his own 1976 article with Waterlow's account. Polansky 
does not use the article in any capacity in the commentary itself, let 
alone even cite the article in his bibliography. Paying attention to 
her article would have made Polansky's and Burnyeat's works more 
engaging, more authoritative, and more philosophically astute. 
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